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ABSTRACT
Average consensus is fundamental for distributed systems since
it underpins key functionalities of such systems ranging from dis-
tributed information fusion, decision-making, to decentralized con-
trol. In order to reach an agreement, existing average consensus
algorithms require each agent to exchange explicit state informa-
tion with its neighbors. This leads to the disclosure of private state
information, which is undesirable in cases where privacy is of con-
cern. In this paper, we propose a novel approach that enables se-
cure and privacy-preserving average consensus in a decentralized
architecture in the absence of any trusted third-parties. By leverag-
ing homomorphic cryptography, our approach can guarantee con-
sensus to the exact value in a deterministic manner. The proposed
approach is light-weight in computation and communication, and
applicable to time-varying interaction topology cases. A hardware
implementation is presented to demonstrate the capability of our
approach.
KEYWORDS
Average consensus, privacy
1 INTRODUCTION
As a building block of distributed computing, average consensus
has been an active research topic in computer science and opti-
mization for decades [3, 10]. In recent years, with the advances
of wireless communications and embedded systems, particularly
the advent of wireless sensor networks and the Internet-of-Things,
average consensus is finding increased applications in fields as di-
verse as automatic control, signal processing, social sciences, ro-
botics, and optimization [15].
Conventional average consensus approaches employ the explicit
exchange of state values among neighboring nodes to reach agree-
ment on the average computation. Such an explicit exchange of
state information has two disadvantages. First, it results in breaches
of the privacy of participating nodes who want to keep their data
confidential. For example, a group of individuals using average
consensus to compute a common opinion may want keep secret
their individual personal opinions [19]. Another example is power
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systems where multiple generators want to reach agreement on
cost while keeping their individual generation information private
[20]. Secondly, storing or exchanging information in the plaintext
form (without encryption) is vulnerable to attackers which try to
steal information by hacking into the communication links or even
the nodes. With the increased number of reported attack events
and the growing awareness of security, keeping data encrypted in
storage and communications has become the norm in many appli-
cations, particularly many real-time sensing and control systems
such as the power systems and wireless sensor networks.
To address the pressing need for privacy and security, recently,
several relevant average consensus approaches have been proposed.
Most of these approaches use the idea of obfuscation to mask the
true state values by adding carefully-designed noise on the state.
Such approaches usually exploit tools such as mean-square statis-
tics [12] or “differential privacy” which is heavily used for database
privacy in computer science [6, 11, 14]. Although enhances privacy,
such noise-based obfuscation also unavoidably affects the perfor-
mance of average consensus, either directly preventing converging
to the true value, or making convergence only achievable in the
statistical mean-square sense. Furthermore, these approaches nor-
mally rely on the assumption of time-invariant interaction graph,
which is difficult to satisfy in many practical applications where
the interaction patterns may vary due to node mobility or fading
communication channels.
Neither can the above noise-based approaches protect nodes
from attackers which try to steal information by hacking into the
nodes or the communication channels. To improve resilience to
such attacks, a common approach is to employ cryptography. How-
ever, it is worth noting that although cryptography based approaches
can easily provide privacy and security when a trusted third-party
is available, like in themulti-party computation [8], their extension
to completely decentralized average consensus without any trusted
third-parties are extremely difficult due to the difficulties in the de-
centralizedmanagement of keys. In fact, in the only reported result
incorporating cryptography into decentralized average consensus
[9], privacy is obtained by paying the price of depriving partici-
pating nodes from access to the final consensus value, although
partial information such as a binary decision is still retrievable for
participating nodes.
In this paper, we propose a homomorphic cryptography based
approach that can guarantee privacy and security in decentralized
average consensus even in the presence of a time-varying interac-
tion graph. Different from existing noise-based privacy-preserving
approacheswhich can only achieve average consensus in the statis-
tic case, our approach can guarantee convergence to the exact aver-
age value in a deterministicmanner. Unlike the existing cryptogra-
phy based average consensus approach in [9], this approach allows
every participating nodes to access the exact final value. Further-
more, the approach is completely decentralized and light-weight
in computation, which makes it easily applicable to resource re-
stricted systems.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the
protocol used for average consensus problem and the homomor-
phic cryptography, particularly the Paillier cryptosystem. Our en-
crypted protocol is introduced in Section 3. In Section 4 we provide
a proof of convergence and bounds of critical parameter, followed
by a systematic discussion of privacy guarantees as well as secu-
rity enforcement mechanisms in Section 5. Implementation issues
and a physical implementation example are presented in Section 6.
The conclusion is drawn in Section 7.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section we briefly review the average consensus problem
and the homomorphic encryption.
2.1 Average Consensus
We follow the same convention as in [15] where a network of M
nodes is represented by a graph G = (V , E, A) with node set V =
{v1, v2, · · · ,vM }, edge set E ⊂ V ×V , and a weighted adjacency
matrix A = [ai j ] which satisfies ai j > 0 if (vi ,vj ) ∈ E and 0
otherwise. The set of neighbors of a node vi is denoted as
Ni =
{
vj ∈ V |(vi ,vj ) ∈ E
}
(1)
Throughout this paper we assume that the graph is undirected and
connected. Therefore, A is symmetric
a
(t )
i j = a
(t )
ji > 0 ∀(vi ,vj ) ∈ E (2)
Note that the superscript t denotes that theweights are time-varying.
Sometimes we drop t for the sake of notation simplicity, but it is
worth noting that all discussions in the paper are always appli-
cable under time-varying weights. To achieve average consensus,
namely converging of all states xi (t) (i = 1, 2, · · · ,M) to the av-
erage of initial values, i.e.,
∑M
i=1 xi (0)
M , one commonly-used update
rule for the continuous-time (CT) domain is
Ûxi (t) =
∑
vj ∈Ni
a
(t )
i j · (xj (t) − xi (t)) (3)
The counterpart for discrete time (DT) is
xi [k + 1] = xi [k] + ε
∑
vj ∈Ni
a
(k)
i j · (xj [k] − xi [k]) (4)
where ε is a constant step size residing in the range (0, 1].
2.2 Homomorphic Encryption
Our method to protect privacy and security is to encrypt the state.
To this end, we briefly introduce a cryptosystem, more specifically
the public-key cryptosystem which is applicable in open and dy-
namic networks without the assist of any trusted third party for
key management. Many popular cryptosystems such as RSA [18],
ElGamal [4], and Paillier [16] are public-key cryptosystems. In this
paper we focus on the Pailler cryptosystem which provides the fol-
lowing basic functions:
• Key generation:
(1) Choose two large prime numbers p and q of equal bit-
length and compute n = pq.
(2) Let д = n + 1.
(3) Let λ = ϕ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1) where ϕ(·) is the Euler’s
totient function.
(4) Let µ = ϕ(n)−1 mod nwhich is themodularmultiplicative
inverse of ϕ(n).
(5) The public key kp is then (n,д).
(6) The private key ks is then (λ, µ).
• Encryption (c = E(m)):
Recall the definitions of Zn = {z |z ∈ Z, 0 ≤ z < n} and
Z
∗
n = {z |z ∈ Z, 0 ≤ z < n, gcd(z,n) = 1} where gcd(a,b) is
the greatest common divisor of a and b .
(1) Choose a random r ∈ Z∗n .
(2) The ciphertext is given by c = дm · rn mod n2, where
m ∈ Zn , c ∈ Z
∗
n2
.
• Decryption (m = D(c)):
(1) Define the integer division function L(u) = u−1n .
(2) The plaintext ism = L(cλ mod n2) · µ mod n.
A cryptosystem is homomorphic if it allows certain computations
to be carried out on the encrypted ciphertext. The Paillier cryp-
tosystem is additive homomorphic because the ciphertext ofm1 +
m2, i.e., E(m1 +m2), can be obtained from E(m1) and E(m2) di-
rectly:
E(m1, r1) · E(m2, r2) =(д
m1r1
n ) · (дm2r2
n) mod n2
=(дm1+m2 (r1r2)
n ) mod n2
=E(m1 +m2, r1r2)
(5)
The dependency on random numbers r1 and r2 is explicitly shown
in (5), yet they play no role in the decryption. For the sake of read-
ability, the following shorthand notation will be used instead:
E(m1) · E(m2) = E(m1 +m2) (6)
Moreover, if we multiply the same ciphertext k ∈ Z+ times, we can
obtain
E(m)k =
k∏
i=1
E(m) = E(
k∑
i=1
m) = E(km) (7)
Notice however, the Paillier cryptosystem is not multiplicative ho-
momorphic because k in (7) is in the plaintext form. Furthermore,
the existence of the random number r in Paillier cryptosystem
gives it resistance to dictionary attacks [5] which infer a key to an
encrypted message by systematically trying all possibilities, like
exhausting all words in a dictionary. Moreover, since Paillier cryp-
tography only works on numbers that can be represented by bi-
nary strings, we multiply a real-valued state by a large integer N
before converting it to a binary string so as to ensure small quan-
tization errors. The details will be discussed in Sec. 6.1.
3 CONFIDENTIAL INTERACTION PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose a completely decentralized, third-party
free confidential interaction protocol that can guarantee average
consensus while protecting the privacy of all participating nodes.
Instead of adding noise to hide the states, our approach combines
encryption with randomness in the system dynamics, i.e., the cou-
pling weights a
(t )
i j , to prevent two communicating parties in a pair-
wise interaction from disclosing information to each other. In this
way the states are free from being contaminated by covering noise,
guaranteeing a deterministic convergence to the exact average value.
In this section we present details of our confidential interaction
protocol based on (3) and (4). In particular we show how a node
can obtain the weighted difference (8) between itself and any of its
neighbor without disclosing each other’s state information:
∆xi j =a
(t )
i j · (xj − xi )
∆xji =a
(t )
ji · (xi − xj )
subject to a
(t )
i j = a
(t )
ji > 0
(8)
Plugging the state difference (8) into (3) gives a new formulation
of continuous-time average consensus
Ûxi (t) =
∑
vj ∈Ni
∆xi j (t) (9)
Similarly, we can rewrite the discrete-time consensus update rule
as
xi [k + 1] = xi [k] + ε
∑
vj ∈Ni
∆xi j [k] (10)
Notice that in a decentralized system it is impossible to protect the
privacy of both nodes in a pairwise interaction if the protocol (8)
is used without a third party distributing secret a
(t )
i j . This is due to
the fact that even if we encrypt all the intermediate steps, if one
node, for instancevi , has access to a
(t )
i j , it can still infer the value of
xj through xj =
∆xi j
a
(t )
i j
+xi . From now on, for the sake of simplicity
in bookkeeping, we omit the superscript t in a
(t )
i j . But it is worth
noting that all the results hold for time-varying weights.
We solve this problem by constructing each weight ai j as the
product of two random numbers, namely ai j = ai · aj = aji , with
0 ≤ ai ≤ a¯ (resp. 0 ≤ aj ≤ a¯) generated by and only known to
node vi (resp. vj , here a¯ is a positive value denoting the range in
implementations which will be explained in detail later). We will
show later that this weight construction approach renders two in-
teracting nodes unable to infer each other’s state while guaran-
teeing convergence to the average. Next, without loss of general-
ity, we use a pair of connected nodes (v1, v2) to illustrate the idea
(cf. Fig. 1). For simplicity, we assume that the states x1 and x2 are
scalar. Each node maintains its own public and private key pairs
(kpi ,ksi ), i ∈ {1, 2}.
Due to symmetry, we only show hownodev1 obtains theweighted
state difference ∆x12, i.e., the flow v1 → v2 → v1. Before starting
the information exchange, nodev1 (resp.v2) generates its new non-
negative random number a1 (resp. a2) which is within a certain
range [0, a¯] in implementation. First, node v1 sends its encrypted
negative state E1(−x1) as well as the public key kp1 to node v2.
Note that here the subscript in E1 denotes encryption using the
public key of node v1. Node v2 then computes the encrypted a2-
weighted difference E1 (a2(x2 − x1)) following the three steps be-
low:
(1) Encrypt x2 with v1’s public key kp1: x2 → E1(x2).
integer before converting it to a binary string to ensure
small quantization errors. The details are available in Sec.
VII. A.
III. THE NCRYPTED ROTOCOL
The main contribution of this paper is a completely de-
centralized, third-party free protocol that guarantees average
consensus while protecting the privacy of the participants.
Instead of adding noise to hide the states, our approach com-
bines encryption and randomness in the system dynamics, i.e.
the coupling weights ij to prevent communicating parties
in a pariwise interaction from exposing information to each
other. In this way the states are free from being contaminated
by covering noise, guaranteeing a deterministic convergence
to the exact average value.
In this section we present details of our encrypted protocol
based on (3) and (4). In particular we focus on the weighted
difference between two connected nodes:
ij ij
ji ji
subject to ij ji
(8)
We call each time (8) is computed between a pair of nodes an
exchange of states. For continuous time system (3) becomes
) = ij (9)
In discrete time (4) becomes
+ 1] = ] + ij (10)
Notice that in a decentralized system it is not possible to
protect the privacy of both nodes if the protocol (8) is used
without a third party distributing secret ij . This is due to
the fact that even if we encrypt all the intermediate steps,
if one node, for instance , has access to ij , it can still
infer the value of (i.e. ij
ij
). From now
on, for the sake of simplicity in bookkeeping, we omit the
superscript in ij . But it is worth noting that all the results
hold for time-varying weights.
We solve his problem by decom osing each eight ij
into the product of two random numbers, namely ij
ji, with only known to node and
only known to node . We will show later that this
decomposed weight approach renders two interacting nodes
unable to infer the other node’s state while guaranteeing
convergence to the average. Next, without loss of generality,
we consider a pair of connected nodes ( , v ) to illustrate
the idea (cf. Fig. 1). For simplicity, we assume that the states
and are scalar. Each node maintains its own public and
private key pairs , k , i ∈ {
Due to symmetry, we only show how node obtains
the weighted state difference, i.e. the flow
Before the start of the information exchange, node (resp.
) generates its new positive random number (resp. ).
First, node sends its encrypted negative state as
v1 (state x1) v2 (state x2)
Generate a Random
Number and a Key Pair
a1, (kp1, ks1) a2, (kp2, ks2)
Encrypt the Negative
State (with its own key)
E1(−x1)
E(−x1, kp1)
E2(−x2)
E(−x2, kp2)
Transmit the State
and Public Key
E2(−x2), kp2 E1(−x1), kp1
Encrypt the State
(with received key)
E2(x1)
E(x1, kp2)
E1(x2)
E(x2, kp1)
Compute the Difference
(in ciphertext)
E2(x1 − x2)
E2(x1)E2(−x2)
E1(x2 − x1)
E1(x2)E1(−x1)
Multiply the Weight
(in ciphertext)
E2(a1(x1 − x2))
E2(x1 − x2)
a1
E1(a2(x2 − x1))
E1(x2 − x1)
a2
Transmit the Result
Back to Sender
E1(a2(x2 − x1)) E2(a1(x1 − x2))
Decrypt the Result a2(x2 − x1)
D(·, ks1)
a1(x1 − x2)
D(·, ks2)
Multiply the Weight
(in plaintext)
∆x12 =
a1a2(x2 − x1)
a1(·)
∆x21 =
a2a1(x1 − x2)
a2(·)
Fig. 1: A step-by-step illustration of the exchange protocol. Single
arrows indicates the flow of steps; double arrows indicate data
exchange via a communication channel. Shaded nodes indicate the
computation done in ciphertext.
well as the public key to node . Node then computes
the encrypted -weighted difference )) as
follows:
1) Encrypt with ’s public key → E
2) Compute the difference directly in ciphertext:
) = + ( )) = · E
(11)
3) Compute the -weighted difference in ciphertext:
)) = ( )) (12)
4) The result from (12) is sent back to
Lastly, decrypts the message with the privates key and
multiplies the result with to get the (balanced-)weighted
difference:
)) −−→
12
(13)
In a similar manner, the exchange produces
)) for who then decrypts the message and
Figure 1: A step-by-step illustration of the confidential in-
teraction protocol. Single arrows indicate the flow of steps;
double arrows indicate data exchange via a communication
channel. Shaded nodes indicate the computation done in ci-
phertext. Note that a1 and a2 are different from step to step.
(2) Compute the difference directly in ciphertext:
E1(x2 − x1) = E1(x2 + (−x1)) = E1(x2) · E1(−x1) (11)
(3) Compute the a2-weighted difference in ciphertext:
E1 (a2(x2 − x1)) = (E1(x2 − x1))
a2 (12)
Thenv2 returnsE1 (a2(x2 − x1)) tov1. After receiving E1 (a2(x2 − x1)),
v1 decrypts it using the private key ks1 and multiplies the result
with a1 to get the weighted difference ∆x12:
E1 (a2(x2 − x1))
D1
−−→ a2(x2 − x1)
∆x12 = a1a2(x2 − x1)
(13)
In a similar manner, the exchange v2 → v1 → v2 produces
E2 (a1(x1 − x2)) for v2 who then decrypts the message and multi-
plies the result by its own multiplier a2 to get ∆x21
E2 (a1(x1 − x2))
D2
−−→ a1(x1 − x2)
∆x21 = a2a1(x1 − x2)
(14)
After each node collects the weighted differences from all neigh-
bors, it updates its state with (3) or (4) accordingly.
Several remarks are in order:
• The construction of each ai j as the product of two random
numbers ai and aj is key to guarantee that the weights are
symmetric, i.e., ai j = aji , which is crucial for average con-
sensus [15].
• v2 does not have the private key of v1 and cannot see x1
which is encrypted in E1(−x1).
• Given a2(x2 − x1), v1 cannot solve for x2 because a2 is only
known to v2.
• At each iteration, real-valued states are converted to fixed
point representation for encryption; theweighted differences
are converted back to real values for update.
• We encrypt E1(−x1) because it is more difficult to compute
subtraction in ciphertext. The issue regarding encrypting
negative values using Paillier is discussed in Sec. 6.
4 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONVERGENCE
In this section, we discuss theoretically the convergence property
under the confidential interaction protocol and how to set the ap-
propriate values for the multiplier ai (and ε for DT).
4.1 Convergence for Continuous-Time
Consensus
Let x ∈ RM denote the augmented state vector of all nodes. The
network dynamics in (3) can be rewritten as:
Ûx = −L(t )x(t) (15)
where L(t ) = [l
(t )
i j ] is the time-varying Laplacian matrix defined by
l
(t )
i j =
{∑
vj ∈Ni a
(t )
i j i = j
−a
(t )
i j i , j
(16)
Theorem 1. If the coupling weights a
(t )
i j in (16) are established
according to the confidential interaction protocol in Sec. 3, then under
any positive bound a¯ > 0, the system will achieve average consensus
with states converging to
lim
t→∞
x(t) = α1 where α = Avg(0) =
1
M
1T x(0) (17)
Proof : It is already known that average consensus can be achieved
if for all time t0 > 0, there exists a constant T¯ > 0 such that a
(t )
i j > 0
is true for some t ∈ [t0, t0 + T¯ ] [13, 15]. Noting that the weights
a
(t )
i j ≥ 0 obtained from the confidential interaction protocol in Sec.
3 are random and independent of each other, the proof can be ob-
tained by following the line of reasoning in [13, 15]. 
4.2 Convergence for Discrete-Time Consensus
In discrete-time domain (4) can be rewritten as
x[k + 1] = P(k)x[k] (18)
where P(k) = I − εL(k) is the Perron matrix and L(k) = [l
(k)
i j ] is the
time-varying Laplacian matrix defined by
l
(k)
i j =
{∑
vj ∈Ni a
(k)
i j i = j
−a
(k)
i j i , j
(19)
Theorem 2. If the coupling weights a
(k)
i j in (19) are established
according to the confidential interaction protocol in Sec. 3 and ε sat-
isfies 0 < ε < 1
∆
where ∆ = maxi |Ni | with | • | denoting the set
cardinality, then under any positive bound 0 < a¯ < 1, the system
will achieve average consensus with states converging to
lim
k→∞
x[k] = α1 with α = Avg[0] =
1
M
1T x[0] (20)
Proof : The proof can be obtained by following the similar line
of reasoning of Corollary 2 in [15]. 
Remark 1. Since the framework allows time-varying weighted
adjacency matrix A(t ) for the discrete-time domain or A(k) for the
discrete-time domain, it can easily be extended to the case with switch-
ing interaction graphs according to [13].
5 ANALYSIS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY
Privacy and security are often used interchangeably in the litera-
ture but here we make the distinction explicit. Among the control
community privacy is equivalent to the concept of unobservability.
Privacy is also closely related to the concept of semantic security
from cryptography [5]. Both concepts essentially concern with an
honest-but-curious adversary which is interested in learning the
states of the network but conforms to the rules of the system. Se-
curity, on the other hand, deals with a broader issue which includes
learning the states as well as the possibilities of exploiting the sys-
tem to cause damages.
5.1 Privacy Guarantees
Our protocol provides protection against an honest-but-curious ad-
versary or an observer eavesdropping the communication. In the
literature, an honest-but-curious adversary is usually defined as a
nodewho follows all protocol steps correctly but is curious and col-
lects received data in an attempt to learn some information about
other participating parties. An observer eavesdropping the com-
munication is usually defined as an adversary who is able to inter-
cept exchanged messages and read the bits within. In this paper,
for the sake of simplicity, we generally refer to both types of ad-
versaries as honest-but-curious adversaries.
The Paillier encryption algorithm is known to provide semantic
security, i.e., Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attack
(IND-CPA) [16]. As a result, the recipient of the first transmission
Ei (−xi ) cannot see the value of xi at any time. We now prove that
an honest-but-curious adversary cannot infer the initial state of a
neighbor even if it can accumulate and correlate the return mes-
sages aiaj (xj − xi ) in multiple steps (except in a trivial case that
should always be avoided, as explained in Theorem 4).
Eve
Alice Bob
∆xEA ∆xEB
∆xAB
(a)
Alice Eve
other
nodes
∆xEA
(b)
Fig. 2: A node should be connected to at least two other nodes to
prevent privacy leak.
Theorem 3. Assume all nodes follow the encrypted protocol.
An honest-but-curious node Eve cannot learn the initial state
of a neighboring node Alice if Alice is also connected to
another non-malicious node Bob.
Proof : Without loss of generality, a simplified but illustrative
configuration is given in Figure 2a. From the perspective of
the honest-but-curious node Eve, the measurements seen at
each time step are Ei ]), i
A,B . In matrix form, define the measurement ] =
EA EB , where:
1 0 0
(23)
Assume the network has converged after steps, the mea-
surement collected by the malicious node is given by
[0 : ] = E,[0: [0] (24)
where the observability matrix E,[0: is defined as
E,[0:
(0)
(1) (0)
(25)
The is the Perron matrix defined in (18). Although
E,[0: can have full rank, the entries of and
are unknown to Eve because and are time-varying
and chosen by Alice and Bob respectively. Therefore despite
the linear equations yielded by E,[0: , all but one
equations contain parameters that are unknown to Eve. Hence
the honest-but-curious node cannot solve the system of linear
equations in (25) to get the initial states of neither [0] nor
[0]
Theorem 4. If a node Alice is connected to the rest of
the network through a (group of collaborating) node(s) Eve,
Alice’s initial state will be inferred from the transmission.
Proof : In this case the observability matrix E,[0: reduces
to a rank sub-matrix where the unknown coefficients cancel
out.
To make it concrete, consider the configuration in Figure
2b. Eve receives EA ] = AE from Alice. In
addition, after the protocol converges after steps, Eve
knows the final state which is identical for all the nodes.
The initial value of Alice can be simply retrieved by
[0] = ] +
=0
AE
=0
EA
(26)
Therefore this single connection configuration should always
be avoided, which is also required by other noise-based
privacy protocols, for instance in [6] and [9].
B. Security Concerns and A Possible Solution
Due to the additive homomorphic property, the Paillier
cryptosystem is vulnerable to an active adversary who is
able to alter the message being sent through the channel.
Although this adversary may not find out the exact states of
the communicating nodes, she/he can still inflict significant
damage to the system.
Consider the scenario where the communication from node
Alice to Bob is intercepted by a hacker Eve. Since Alice’s
public key pA is sent along with , the hacker may
use the additive homomorphism to inject an arbitrary noise
to modify the original message to . If Bob has no
way to tell if the received message has been modified, the
hacker may exploit this vulnerability to make the network
either converge to the wrong average or not converge at all.
This issue is shown in Figure 3a.
In applications where security is the primary concern, it is
imperative to be able to verify the authenticity and integrity
of any incoming message. For this reason it is common to
attach a digital signature along with the original message.
The recipient can thus verify that the message is sent from
the authorized party and has not been altered during the
transmission. The idea is illustrated in Figure 3b.
The digital signature typically requires an additional pair
of keys by both parties ( and ) and a hash function
). On the one hand, any attempt by Eve to modify
the transmission will cause mismatches between the received
message and the signature. On the other hand, the fact that
Bob can decrypt to recover the message with Alice’s
public key means that the message was indeed encrypted
by Alice with the matching private key.
VI. EXTENSION TO THER ONSENSUS
Using the same encrypted protocol, it is possible to
achieve privacy and security in other types of consensus.
Figure 2: A node should be connected to at least one legiti-
mate node to prevent privacy leak.
As per the naming convention in cryptography, it is customary
to name the legitimate sender and receiver participants asA (Alice)
and B (Bob), and the adversary as E (Eve).
Theorem 3. Assume that all nodes foll w t confidential interac-
tion protocol. An honest-but-curious node Eve cannot learn the initial
state of a neighboring node Alice if Alice is also connected to another
legitimate node Bob.
Proof : Without loss of generality, we consider the connection
configuration illustrated in Fig. 2 (a) where Eve can interact with
both Alice and Bob. If Eve cannot infer the state of Alice or Bob in
this configuration, neither can it when either the Alice—Eve con-
nection or the Bob—Eve connection is removed which reduces the
information accessible to Eve.
From the perspective of the honest-but-curious node Eve, the
measurements seen at each time stepk are∆xEi [k] = a
(k)
i a
(k)
E
(xi [k]−
xE [k]), i ∈ {A,B}. In matrix form, define these observations as
yE [k]
yE [k] = [∆xEA[k], ∆xEB [k]]
T
= C
(k)
E
x[k]
where:
C
(k)
E
=
[
−a
(k)
A
a
(k)
E
a
(k)
A
a
(k)
E
0
−a
(k)
B
a
(k)
E
0 a
(k)
B
a
(k)
E
]
(21)
It can be easily derived that after K steps, the measurements col-
lected by Eve are given by
yE [0 : K] = OE, [0:K ]x[0] (22)
where the observability matrix OE, [0:K ] is given by
OE, [0:K ] =

C
(0)
E
C
(1)
E
P(0)
.
.
.
C
(K )
E
∏0
k=K−1
P(k)

(23)
with P(k) being the Perron matrix defined in (18). Note that the
entries of C
(k)
E
and P(k) are unknown to Eve because a
(k)
A
and a
(k)
B
are randomly chosen by Alice and Bob respectively. Therefore, the
ability for Eve to infer the state of other nodes cannot be analyzed
using conventional observability based approach in e.g., [2, 17].
We propose a new analysis approach based on the solvability of
systems of equations. From (22) it can be seen that Eve can estab-
lish 2(K + 1) equations based on received information from time
instant 0 to K . Given that after consensus, Eve can know the final
s ate of other nodes which is equal to its own final state (represent
it as αconsensus), it can establish one more equation
xA[0] + xB [0] + xE [0] = 3αconsensus, (24)
which makes the number of employable equations to 2(K + 1) + 1.
If there are more than 2(K + 1) + 1 unknowns involved in these
2(K+1)+1 equations, then it is safe to say that Eve cannot solve the
equations and get the initial states of xA[0] and xB [0]. In fact, the
confidential interaction protocol introduces 2(K + 1) unknown pa-
rameters a
(0)
A
, a
(1)
A
, · · · ,a
(K )
A
, a
(0)
B
, a
(1)
B
, · · · ,a
(K )
B
, which, in combi-
nat on with xA[0],xB [0] unk own to Eve, will make the total num-
ber of unknowns to 2(K +1)+2. Therefore, the honest-but-curious
Eve cannot use the accessible 2(K + 1) + 1 system of equations in
(22) to solve for the initial states of xA[0] and xB [0]. 
Remark 2. Following the same line of reasoning, it can be ob-
tained that an honest-but-curious node Eve 1 cannot infer the initial
state of a neighboring node Alice if Alice is also connected to another
honest-but-curious node Eve 2 that does not collude with Eve 1.
Based on the analysis framework, we can also obtain a situation
in which it is possible for Eve to infer other nodes’ states which
should be avoided.
Theorem 4. If a node Alice is connected to the rest of the network
only through an (or a group of colluding) honest-but-curious node(s)
Eve, then Alice’s initial state can be inferred by Eve.
Proof : If Alice is directly connected tomultiple honest-but-curious
nodes that collude with each other, then these nodes can share in-
formation with each other to cooperatively estimate Alice’s state,
and hence can be rega ded as one node. Therefore, we just consider
the case where Alice is only co nected to one honest-but-curious
node Eve, as illustrated in Fig. 2 (b). In this case, from the perspec-
tive of the honest-but-curious node Eve, the measurement seen at
each time step k is ∆xEA[k] = a
(k)
A
a
(k)
E
(xA[k] − xE [k]). Similar to
the proof of Theorem 3, we can write the measurements accessible
to Eve in a matrix for yE [k] = [∆xEA] = C
(k)
E
x[k], where
C
(k)
E
=
[
−a
(k)
A
a
(k)
E
a
(k)
A
a
(k)
E
]
(25)
After K steps, th measurements collecte by Eve are given by
yE [0 : K] = OE, [0:K ]x[0] (26)
with the observability matrix OE, [0:K ] having the same form as
(23).
Now in the K + 1 equations collected by Eve in (26), there are
K + 2 unknowns xA[0], a
(0)
A
, a
(1)
A
, · · · , a
(K )
A
. However, after con-
verging to average consensus, Eve will be able to know the final
state of other nodes (the same as its final state), which enables it
to construct another equation about the initial states like (24). This
will make the total number of equations equal to the total number
of involved unknowns and make solving initial state of xA possible.

Next we use an example to illustrate that it is indeed possible
for Eve to infer the state of Alice if Eve is Alice’s only neighbor.
Consider the configuration in Fig. 2 (b). Eve receives ∆xEA[k] =
−∆xAE [k] from Alice. In addition, when the protocol converges
after K steps, Eve knows the final state which is identical for all
the nodes. The initial value of Alice can be simply inferred by Eve
through
xA[0] = xA[K] + ε
K−1∑
k=0
∆xAE [k]
= xE [K] − ε
K−1∑
k=0
∆xEA[k]
(27)
Therefore this single connection configuration should always be
avoided, which is also required by other data-obfuscation based
privacy protocols, for instance in [11] and [12].
5.2 Security Solution
Due to the additive homomorphic property, the Paillier cryptosys-
tem is vulnerable to active adversaries who are able to alter the
message being sent through the channel. Although such adver-
saries cannot find out the exact states of the communicating nodes,
they can still inflict significant damage to the system.
Consider the scenario where the communication from node Al-
ice to Bob is intercepted by an active adversary Eve (cf. Fig. 3 (a)).
Since Alice’s public key kpA is sent along with EA(−xA), Eve may
use the additive homomorphism to inject an arbitrary noise ξ to
the original message EA(−xA) to sway it to EA(−xA + ξ ). If Bob
has no way to tell if the received message has been modified, Eve
may exploit this vulnerability tomake the network either converge
to a wrong value or not converge at all.
In applications where security is of prime concern, it is imper-
ative to be able to verify the integrity of any incoming message.
We propose to attach a digital signature to the exchanged mes-
sage in the confidential interaction protocol, based on which the
recipient can verify possible modifications during communication.
The signature requires an additional pair of public/private keys
(k ′
pA
,k ′
sA
) and a hash function H(·), and is represented as (k ′
sA
,
E′
A
[H(m),CA]), where CA is an unforgeable certificate assigned
by an authority. The additional private key k ′
sA
is sent so that Bob
can decrypt E′
A
[H(m)] and check if the resulting H(m) matches
the receivedm in terms of the hash operation H(·) (cf. Fig. 3 (b)).
Because without the public key k ′
pA
, Eve cannot forge a valid sig-
nature (that can be decrypted by Bob), any Eve’s attempt tomodify
m will cause a mismatch between receivedm and decryptedH(m)
in terms of the hash operationH(·).
6 IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
In addition to the constraints imposed on ai and ε , there are other
technical issues that must be addressed for the implementation of
our confidential interaction protocol.
wh re the observability mat ix E,K is defined as
E,[0:
(0)
(1) (0)
(40)
The is the Perron matrix defined in (29). Although
E,[0: can have full rank, the entries of and
are unknown to Eve because and are time-varying
and chosen by Alice and Bob respectively. Therefore despite
the linear equations yielded by E,[0: , all but one
equations contain parameters that are unknown to Eve. Hence
the honest-but-curious node cannot solve the system of linear
equations in (40) to get the initial states of neither [0] nor
[0]
Theorem 4. If a node Alice is connected to the rest of
the network through a (group of collaborating) node(s) Eve,
Alice’s initial state will be inferred from the transmission.
Proof : In this case the observability matrix E,K reduces to
a rank 2 sub-matrix where the unknown coefficients cancel
out.
To make it concrete, consider the configuration in Figure
2b. Eve receives EA ] = AE from Alice. In
addition, after the protocol converges after steps, Eve
knows the final state which is identical for all the nodes.
The initial value of Alice can be simply retrieved by
[0] = ] +
=1
AE (41)
=1
EA (42)
Therefore this single connection configuration should always
be avoided, which is also required by other noise-based
privacy protocols, for instance in [6] and [9].
B. Security Concerns and A Possible Solution
Due to the additive homomorphic property, the Paillier
cryptosystem is vulnerable to an active adversary who is
able to alter the message being sent through the channel.
Although this adversary may not find out the exact states of
the communicating nodes, she/he can still inflict significant
damage to the system.
Consider the scenario where the communication from node
Alice to Bob is intercepted by a hacker Eve. Since Alice’s
public key pA is sent along with , the hacker may
use the additive homomorphism to inject an arbitrary noise
to modify the original message to . If Bob has no
way to tell if the received message has been modified, the
hacker may exploit this vulnerability to make the network
either converge to the wrong average or not converge at all.
This issue is shown in Figure 3a.
In applications where security is the primary concern, it is
imperative to be able to verify the authenticity and integrity
Alice Bob
Eve
kpA (a)
m, kpA ⇒ m
′, kpA
m = EA(−xA) m
′ = EA(−xA + ξ)
Alice
k′sA, k
′
pA
Bob
k′sA
Eve
k′sA (b)
m, k′sA, E
′
A[H(m), CA]
k′sA
Fig. 3: Illustration of establishing a secure communication channel
with a digital signature.
of any incoming message. For this reason it is common to
attach a digital signature along with the original message.
The recipient can thus verify that the message is sent from
the authorized party and has not been altered during the
transmission. The idea is illustrated in Figure 3b.
The digital signature typically requires an additional pair
of keys by both parties ( and ) and a hash function
). On the one hand, any attempt by Eve to modify
the transmission will cause mismatches between the received
message and the signature. On the other hand, the fact that
Bob can decrypt to recover the message with Alice’s
public key means that the message was indeed encrypted
by Alice with the matching private key.
VI. EXTENSION TO THER ONSENSUS
Using the same encrypted protocol, it is possible to
achieve privacy and security in other types of consensus.
Here we show the applications to two other commonly used
consensus problems, the weighted average consensus and
maximum/minimum consensus.
A. Weighted Average Consensus
The weighted average consensus can be achieved easily
by introducing a fixed weight with
For continuous time (9) becomes
) = ij (43)
For discrete time (10) becomes
+ 1] = ] + ij (44)
Theorem 5. Under the the encrypted protocol in Sec. III,
update rule (43) can achieve secure and privacy-preserving
weighted average consensus in the continuous-time domain,
i.e.,
lim
→∞
) =
(0)
(45)
Figure 3: Illustration of attacks from an active attacker (a)
and the defense mechanism with a digital signature (b).
6.1 Quantization
Real-world applications typically have xi ∈ R which are repre-
sented by floating point numbers in modern computing architec-
tures. On the contrary, encryption algorithms only work on un-
signed integers. Define the casting function f (·, ·) : R×R→ M ⊂
Z and its inverse f −1(·, ·) : M × R→ R as
f (x,N ) = ⌈Nx⌋M , f
−1(y,N ) =
y
N
(28)
where ⌈·⌋M maps the input to the nearest integer in M . For the
Paillier cryptosystem, this mapping is equivalent to the rounding
operation, hence the step size is ∆Y = 1 which is uniform. Conse-
quently the maximum quantization error is bounded by
max
x ∈R
|x − f −1(f (x,N ),N )| =
∆Y
N
(29)
In practice we choose a sufficiently large value for N so that the
quantization error is negligible. This is exactly how we convert
the state xi of a node from real value to a fixed length integer and
back to a floating point number. The conversion is performed at
each iteration of the protocol.
6.2 Subtraction and Negative Values
Another issue is how to treat the sign of an integer for encryption.
[7] solves this problem by mapping negative values to the end of
the group Zn where n = pq is given by the public key. We offer an
alternative solution by taking advantages of the fact that encryp-
tion algorithms blindly treat bit strings as unsigned integers. In our
implementation all integer values are stored in fix-length integers
(i.e., long int in C) and negative values are left in two’s complement
format. Encryption and intermediate computations are carried out
as if the underlying data were unsigned. When the final message
is decrypted, the overflown bits (bits outside the fixed length) are
discarded and the remaining binary number is treated as a signed
integer which is later converted back to a real value.
6.3 Implementation on Raspberry Pi
To confirm the effectiveness of the secure and privacy-preserving
average consensus approach in real-world cyber-physical systems,
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Figure 4: All nodes converge to the average consensus value
in the experimental verification using Raspberry Pi boards.
The states have initial values as 290, 746, 541, 383, 301, and
675, respectively and they all converge to the average con-
sensus value 489.33 in about 13 steps.
we implemented the algorithm on six Raspberry Pi boards with
64-bit ARMv8 CPU and 1 GB RAM.
In the implementation, the communicationwas conducted through
Wi-Fi based on the “sys/socket.h" C library. Paillier encrption and
decryption were realized using the “libpaillier-0.8" library from [1].
To obtain ∆xi j in a pair-wise interaction, a node employs a request
message to initialize the interaction and the other node replies with
a response message. In a multi-node network, for a node to be
able to simultaneously receive requests and responses from multi-
ple neighbors, parallelism needed to be introduced. The “pthread"
C library was used to generate multiple parallel threads to han-
dle incoming requests and responses. Each time a node receives
a request/response, it generates a new thread to handle it and im-
mediately listens for more requests. Because in the implementa-
tion, it is impossible to start all nodes simultaneously, a counter
is introduced on each node and its value is embedded in each re-
quest/response packet to help nodes make sure that they are on
the same pace. For 64 byte encryption key, the size of the actual
packet is 144 bytes, which includes all necessary headers and stuff-
ing bytes. For each interaction, the average processing latency was
7.8 ms, which is acceptable for most real-time cyber-physical sys-
tems. The implementation result is given in Fig. 4, which shows
that perfect consensus can be achieved.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paperwe proposed a decentralized secure and privacy-preserving
protocol for the network average consensus problem. In contrast
to previous approaches where the states are covered with random
noise which unavoidably affects the convergence performance, we
encode randomness to the system dynamics with the help of an ad-
ditive homomorphic cryptosystem which allows the convergence
to the exact average in a deterministic manner. The protocol also al-
lows easy incorporation of active attacker defending mechanisms.
Although our approach has higher computational complexity com-
pared to the unencrypted alternatives, experimental results on Rasp-
berry Pi confirm that the computational burden is manageable on
resource-restricted cyber-physical systems.
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